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Abstract
Many theoretical models show that redistribution causes low growth or
capital outflows even though empirically redistribution and growth are of-
ten found to be positively associated across countries. This paper argues
that tax competition and the danger of capital outflows leads optimizing
governments to pursue high growth, no redistribution policies in techno-
logically similar economies. However, the government of a technologically
superior economy may attract foreign and domestically owned capital and
may have relatively higher GDP growth and more resources for redistri-
bution than in a closed economy. Thus, redistributing governments may
have a relatively stronger interest in technological advance or high eco-
nomic integration. The results imply that one may well observe a positive
association between redistribution and growth across countries.
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1 Introduction
In the theoretical literature it is frequently argued that redistributive taxation
causes low growth or capital outflows even though the same authors usually
establish that inequality is bad for growth. See, for example, Perotti (1993),
Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
others. Surprisingly, empirical studies such as e.g. Easterly and Rebelo (1993),
Perotti (1994) or Sala-i-Martin (1996) often find that redistributive transfers are
significantly positively related to long-run growth across countries. This paper
analyzes that puzzle in an non-cooperative, open economy framework.1
Suppose the government faced the redistribution-capital-outflow-low-growth
problem and that stopping capital outflows was good for growth. Then in a
world, in which capital was - perhaps only weakly - mobile, it might deal with
the problem in two reasonable ways. First, the government could act sequentially.
It might prefer not to tolerate capital outflows at all. After having secured the
maximum possible size of the capital stock, it might then, and only if feasible,
redistribute. Second, it could solve the problem simultaneously. It might strictly
prefer to redistribute at the expense of losing some capital. Below the sequential
approach is referred to as SQ and the simultaneous approach as SM.2
Clearly, the welfare implications of SM or SQ would in general be very differ-
ent. However, this paper concentrates on the case where both would lead to the
1Thus, the paper complements research which argues that redistribution may be good
for growth in closed economies. See e.g. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996), Lee and Roemer
(1998), Aghion, Caroli and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (1999) or Jovanovic (2000). For surveys of the
redistribution-growth literature see, for example, Be´nabou (1996), Bertola (1999) or Temple
(1999).
2For instance, Rehme (1997) shows that when economies are technologically similar and
linked by imperfect capital mobility, a government pursuing SM knows it cannot offer a better
return to capital than the growth maximizing one. It then decides to let capital flow out and
redistribute the capital that remains in the country. Capital outflows might be prevented,
however, if the government pursued a SQ policy as argued in this paper.
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same policy which is given in a situation when capital mobility is perfect.
In the model and as is common, the accumulated factor of production is iden-
tified with capital and the non-accumulated factor of production with labour.
The paper builds on Alesina and Rodrik (1994) by analyzing optimizing govern-
ments that tax the capital owners’ wealth. The tax scheme is meant to represent
a broad class of tax arrangements and is to be interpreted as a metaphor cap-
turing the essence for many kinds of redistributive policies.3 In order to focus
on distributional conflicts the agents are assumed to be represented by govern-
ments that are either entirely pro-capital (’right-wing’), or completely pro-labour
(’left-wing’). The logic of the model would be the same if governments attached
different social weights to the workers’ and capital owners’ welfare.
For given policies the open economy market equilibrium is characterized by
balanced growth and the return on capital is always equal across countries. How-
ever, their levels of GDP may be very different. In this setting governments are
taken to engage in tax competition which has been studied in numerous papers.4
Within countries changes in government usually do not appear to produce
drastic changes in redistribution policy. However, essential policy differences be-
tween countries seem to have important consequences for their economic perfor-
mance. See e.g. Razin and Yuen (1996). These differences are captured as follows:
A right-wing government wants to maximize the domestic capital owners’ world-
wide income and does not care about the domestically installed capital stock. In
contrast, a left-wing government wants a high level and growth of GDP, because
3Clearly, tax schemes differ widely across countries and usually depend on many things such
as history, politics, or institutions. Therefore, an answer to the question which particular tax
scheme a society chooses has to remain outside of this paper’s analysis. For similar arguments
and examples of what other redistributive mechanisms the wealth tax scheme metaphorically
captures see Alesina and Rodrik’s paper.
4See, for instance, Gordon (1983), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), Bond and Samuelson
(1989), Kehoe (1989), Sinn (1990), Persson and Tabellini (1992) or Kanbur and Keen (1993).
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wages depend positively on the domestically productive capital stock. Therefore,
it does everything to prevent capital flight and wishes to attract (’grab’) as much
domestically or foreign owned capital as possible.
For technologically similar economies, whose governments compete in taxes,
it is shown that in equilibrium there is no room for redistribution. Thus, even
two left-wing governments do not redistribute in the optimum. The intuition
for the result is the following: For redistribution a government has to set high
taxes, which imply a low return to capital, inducing capital flight. The resulting
decrease in welfare is so high that a left-wing government is better off if it does
not redistribute. Compensation is given by stopping any capital relocation and
securing high wages.
If two right-wing governments compete, there is an infinite number of Nash
equilibria in which the capital owners never pay more or less than the tax rate
which maximizes their worldwide income. As a consequence there is almost surely
capital flight for one country, in which the workers would ’starve’. In contrast
the capital owners would not suffer, because they can derive income abroad.
Under left-right competition the equilibrium is unique, because the left-wing
government wants to ’grab’ capital and pursue a high tax, high wage policy. But
high taxes drive out capital. Thus, the left-wing government tries to undercut
its opponent in order to attract capital. In equilibrium both choose the growth
maximizing tax rate. The equilibrium capital allocation is indeterminate, but
the occurrence of capital flight is of measure zero. Interestingly, one economy’s
workers may then be better off under a right-wing than under a left-wing policy.
If two left-wing governments compete, both choose the growth maximizing
policy as well. The effects of redistributive concerns are competed away for fear
of capital flight. Hence, for similar countries, distributive preferences alone do
3
not lead to non-maximal growth.
If the countries differ in technology, the efficient economy’s government can
always guarantee a higher after-tax return on capital and find more productive
capital located in its economy than an inefficient economy’s one. A government
in a technologically superior economy is then able to redistribute and have higher
GDP growth than its opponent. The amount of redistribution is limited by the
tax choices of its opponent and its efficiency advantage. But because of capital
relocation from abroad more resources can be redistributed and the level and
growth of GDP are higher when capital mobility is very high. For these reasons
it would be in the interest of an efficient economy’s redistributing government
to operate in a world with very high capital mobility. Furthermore, it is argued
that in the long-run a government that wishes to redistribute would generally
have a relatively stronger interest in innovation (superior technology) than a
non-redistributing government as that enlarges redistributive freedom.
Thus, distributing resources towards labour is bad for notional growth in the
model. However, in terms of observable comparisons, either an optimizing, redis-
tributing government chooses the growth maximizing tax rate in similar countries
against any opponent or it has a more efficient economy, distributes resources to-
wards labour and has a higher observed GDP growth than its opponent, no matter
whether the latter wants to redistribute or not. But then redistribution should
correlate positively with growth when comparing countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model set-up, and
presents the optimal, closed economy policies. Section 3 analyzes tax competition
among governments. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
Consider a two-country world with a domestic and a foreign country. Denote
variables in the foreign country by a (∗). It is commonly assumed that labour
is less mobile than capital.5 To capture that it is assumed that there are many
identical, immobile individuals in each country, who are all equally patient. The
capital owners do not work, but they invest; the workers never save and just
consume their entire income.6 Both groups derive logarithmic utility, defined on
R ≡ R ∪ {−∞}, from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable good that
is produced in the two countries. Foreign and domestic output are perfect sub-
stitutes in consumption. Following Barro (1990) aggregate production is carried
out according to
Yt = AK
α
t G
1−α
t L
1−α
t where Kt = ωtkt + (1− ω∗t )k∗t , (1)
α ∈ (0, 1) and Yt is output produced in the home country. Kt is an index
of the domestically productive capital stock, and kt (k
∗
t ) is the (broad) capital
stock, including disembodied technological knowledge, owned by domestic (for-
eign) capitalists and Gt are public inputs to production. Furthermore, Lt = 1,
so that labour is supplied inelastically. Technology differences between the coun-
tries are due to A, which is an efficiency index, reflecting cultural, institutional
and technological development. If both countries are equally efficient (A = A∗),
5An interesting alternative to this assumption is provided by Lee (1999) who studies tax
competition with distributional conflicts showing that it is optimal for labour to follow capital.
6This uses a shortcut of a result due to Bertola (1993) who has shown in an endogenous
growth framework that agents whose initial income derives from labour (capital) only will not
find it optimal to save (to work) on a steady state, balanced growth path. Thus, the model set-
up is reminiscent of Kaldor (1956), where different proportions of profits and wages are saved.
However, in Kaldorian models growth determines factor share incomes, whereas in endogenous
growth models the direction is rather from factor shares to growth.
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the economies are called similar, because they may well be different in certain
elements of the index such as institutional or cultural development. If A 6= A∗
the economies are called different.
The fraction of real capital at date t owned by domestic capitalists allocated to
the home country is denoted by ωt ∈ [0, 1]. The rest is located abroad. Thus, the
capital stocks are taken to be perfectly mobile across countries. In the context of
long-run growth, this is taken to reflect that relocation costs of capital, including
technological knowledge, are negligible in the long-run compared to the income
stream that may be derived from operating the capital stock somewhere else.
Furthermore, the model allows for the case that all of the domestically owned
capital is located abroad which is supposed to bring out sharply any long-run
effects capital flight may have. Throughout the analysis I abstract from problems
arising from depreciation of the capital stock.
The Public Sector. In both countries wealth is taxed at constant rates, and
the governments adopt the source principle for wealth taxation.7 This may be
justified by the observation that in a non-cooperative environment with very
high capital mobility, and absent any problems arising from transfer pricing,
governments may not be able to monitor their residents’ wealth perfectly. For
similar points see e.g. Razin and Sadka (1991). Furthermore, constancy of the tax
rates is assumed in order to concentrate on long-term, time-consistent policies.
The domestic tax rate τ is levied on domestically owned wealth ωtkt and
foreign owned wealth (1− ω∗t )k∗t operating in the domestic economy. Analogous
7The source principle requires that all types of income originating in a country be taxed
uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the income recipients. Here the governments
adopt the source principle for the taxation of internationally mobile wealth. Differential taxation
of foreigners’ and residents’ wealth at source in a similar set-up has been analyzed in Rehme
(1995). The results there suggest that tax discrimination may lead to non-steady state equilibria
or similar results as in this paper.
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definitions hold for the foreign country and its government. Both governments
run balanced budgets, τKt = Gt. Thus, domestic tax revenues are used for public
expenditures spent on public inputs channelled into domestic production.
The Private Sector. The firms are owned by domestic and foreign capital
owners, who rent capital to and demand shares of the firms. They take public
inputs to production parametrically. Perfect competition and profit maximization
entail that the domestic firms pay each factor of production its marginal product
r =
∂Yt
∂Kt
= αAτ 1−α, and wt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
≡ η(τ)Kt = (1− α)Aτ 1−αKt (2)
where Lt = 1 for all t. As k and k
∗ are perfect substitutes in production, the
return on foreign and domestically owned capital is equal and constant in each
country. Furthermore, the wages grow with the aggregate capital stock. For fixed
Kt the pre-tax return on capital and the wage rate are increasing in taxes.
The workers derive utility from consuming their entire income, they do not
invest and are not taxed by assumption. Their intertemporal utility is given by
∫ ∞
0
lnCWt e
−ρtdt where CWt = η(τ)Kt. (3)
The capitalists choose how much to consume or invest, they have perfect
foresight, and take prices and policy as given. As they may invest in either
country they determine where to allocate their capital stock. Physical capital is
taken to be entirely collateralized by tradeable stocks at each point in time. The
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capitalists’ maximization problem is
max
Ckt ,ωt
∫ ∞
0
lnCkt e
−ρtdt (4a)
s.t. k˙t = (r − τ)ωtkt + (r∗ − τ ∗)(1− ωt)kt − Ckt , (4b)
0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1 , (4c)
k(0) = k0, k(∞) = free. (4d)
where equation (4b) is the dynamic budget constraint of the capitalists who earn
rωtkt income at home and r
∗(1 − ωt)kt income abroad. By assumption perfect
capital mobility prevails so that it is costless to send and install capital abroad.
The solution to this problem is standard and and involves the capital alloca-
tion decision,
ωt =

1 : (r − τ) > (r∗ − τ ∗)
∈ [0, 1] : (r − τ) = (r∗ − τ ∗)
0 : (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ ∗)
(5)
by which the capitalists immediately shift their assets to the country where the
after-tax return on capital is higher. Thus, relative to the planning horizon the
speed of capital relocation is short. This is due to the assumption that relocation
costs are negligible relative to the planning horizon in which a new, higher income
stream may be derived forever. Note that even if the after-tax returns are equal,
ω = 1 or ω = 0 are possible.8 Furthermore, for given tax rates and ω the
transversality condition and the budget constraint imply that consumption and
8Some authors such as Lancaster (1973) and contributions based on his paper analyze invest-
ment bang-bang problems and simply define indeterminacies away. However, indeterminacies
may contain qualitatively valuable information as is argued in this paper.
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wealth optimally grow at the same rate
γ =
C˙kt
Ckt
=
k˙t
kt
= M − ρ, where M ≡ max (r − τ, r∗ − τ ∗) (6)
which depends on the after-tax returns in the two countries. It is possible in the
model that growth is completely determined by the foreign after-tax return when
ω = 0 and all the domestic capital would ’bang’ into the foreign country.
Market Equilibrium. In the closed economy ω = 1, Kt = kt for given tax
rates. From the budget constraints the steady state market equilibrium for given
policy is characterized by balanced growth of all aggregates at the rate γ. Fur-
thermore, the long-run growth rate is first increasing and then decreasing, thus,
concave in τ , and maximized when τ = τˆ ≡ [α(1− α)A] 1α .
Following Alesina and Rodrik redistribution is defined in this model as taxa-
tion that creates disincentives to accumulate, and it is measured as follows:
Definition 1 Redistribution is measured by λ = τ
τˆ
, that is, by the fraction of
taxes (in terms of tax base) levied under policy τ to the taxes (in terms of tax
base) under policy τˆ where the latter guarantees the highest after-tax income for
the owners of the accumulated factor of production.
Thus, for any τ > τˆ resources are redistributed from the accumulated to the
non-accumulated factor of production leading to lower growth.9
For the derivation of the two-country market equilibrium and given arbitrary
9Taking growth maximizing policies as a benchmark may have its virtues when taking into
account that people appear to have difficulties disentangling the relationship between utility
enhancing income growth and the distribution of income at each point in time. See e.g. Amiel
and Cowell (1999). An alternative redistribution mechanism could be that a fraction of tax
revenues is spent in the form of direct transfers to workers. See Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
p. 466. It is not difficult to verify that the paper’s qualitative results for open economies would
not change if one introduced such a separate policy instrument. See Rehme (1999).
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tax rates consider the domestic economy first. Divide (4b) by kt, and use the fact
that in steady state γk is constant. Rearranging and taking time derivatives yields
γ = γk and constant. Also, substituting γ for γk in (4b) establishes that C
k
t = ρkt
as the capitalists’ instantaneous consumption in steady state. Hence, in the open
economy the domestic capitalists’ consumption grows at the same, constant rate
as their capital stock. The total wealth of the domestic capitalists at any point in
time is kt and the budget constraint satisfies equation (4b). Analogous reasoning
applies to the foreign capitalists. For given ω, ω∗ one easily verifies that the world
resource constraint is met.
In equilibrium GDPt = Yt so that GDP must grow at the same rate as output.
But Yt grows at same rate as Kt since Gt grows at the same rate as Kt. Then
the evolution of the domestic economy is determined by the growth rate of the
aggregate, domestically productive capital stock which is given by
Γt ≡ K˙t
Kt
=
γωeγtk0 + γ
∗(1− ω∗)eγ∗tk∗0
ωeγtk0 + (1− ω∗)eγ∗tk∗0
. (7)
Let a(τ) ≡ r − τ , b(τ ∗) ≡ r∗ − τ ∗ and M ≡ max (a(τ), b(τ ∗)) and notice that
γ = M − ρ = γ∗. Thus, the capital income component of GNP grows at equal
rates across countries. But then the aggregate capital stock in (7) grows at
Γt =
γ : for ∀ ω, ω
∗ s.t. ω 6= 0 ∧ ω∗ 6= 1
0 : if ω = 0 ∧ ω∗ = 1,
(8)
because if there is capital flight all capital is shifted abroad. Otherwise, the
aggregate capital stock grows at the same rate as the capital income component
of GNP.10
10Thus, return discrepancies are immediately ’arbitraged’ out, exerting a smoothing effect on
growth. Any alteration in these differentials would generally induce instantaneous convergence
10
The allocation of capital has important consequences for the instantaneous
levels of output, consumption and the aggregate capital stock. From (4b) and (6)
the capital owners’ instantaneous consumption is Ckt = ρkt, and similarly for the
workers’ instantaneous consumption one gets CWt = ηKt when there is no capital
flight. For both groups consumption depends on the after-tax return on capital. If
a country experiences capital flight, aggregate production breaks down completely
in the model and the workers must ’starve’. The capital owners, however, would
survive, because they may derive income abroad and may consume foreign goods.
In equilibrium the worker’s and the capitalist’s welfare is
∫ t
0
lnCjt e
−ρtdt where
j = k,W . Let t → ∞ and use integration by parts. For this define v2 = lnCjt ,
and dv1 = e
−ρtdt. Recall that Γ = γ when there is no capital flight so that
dv2 =
˙
Cjt
Cjt
= γ and constant in steady state. Then v1 = −1ρ e−ρt and
∫ ∞
0
lnCjt e
−ρt dt =
1
ρ
[− lnCjt e−ρt]∞0 + 1ρ
∫ ∞
0
γ e−ρt dt =
lnCj0
ρ
− γ
ρ2
where Ck0 = ρk0 and C
W
0 = (η + λτ)K0 and K0 = ωk0 + (1 − ω∗)k∗0. If there is
capital flight, the workers suffer infinite disutility. In general, the capitalist’s as
well as the worker’s welfare depends positively on growth and capital.
The Government. The domestic government maximizes the intertemporal
utility of its national clientele. A government that is entirely pro-capital is called
’right-wing’ and a government that is completely pro-labour is referred to as
’left-wing’.11
to a new steady state. For instance, Razin and Yuen (1997) show that capital mobility may be
a powerful force in equalizing output growth across countries.
11Thus, the paper relates to recent partisan political models which are an alternative to
the Downsian models. See Roemer (2001) or Lee and Roemer (2001). In these models, two
political parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, whereas ideological parties
can never exist at the equilibrium in the Downsian framework. Thus, the partisan political
11
The capital owners’ welfare is
V r =
ln(ρk0)
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
, ∀ ω, ω∗ ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
so that the model’s right-wing government is only concerned about growth of the
capital owners’ wealth.
The welfare of the workers is given by
V l =

ln [η(τ)K0]
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
: ∀ω, ω∗ s.t. ω 6= 0, ω∗ 6= 1
−∞ : ω = 0, ω∗ = 1,
(10)
which is not a proper function, since for arbitrary policies the ω’s may be inde-
terminate. But V l is definitely increasing in γ and so in M . As M determines
ω and ω∗, any left-wing policy must try to optimize M and would, thus, also
try to maximize growth. More importantly, however, the left-wing government
wants to secure a high capital stock and so high wages. It will want to avoid any
situation that leads to capital flight. In that sense and for a given growth rate
the left-wing government wants to ’grab’ capital.
Closed Economy Policies. The government chooses taxes to maximize its
clientele’s welfare and it respects the right of private property.12 Suppose it solves
max
τ
(1− β)V r + β V l s.t. λ ≥ 0 where β denotes the social weights attached to
the workers’ intertemporal welfare.
Let E ≡ (1 − α)Aτ−α. Then the first order condition for the maximization
models provide a justification for the assumption that ideological parties exist and compete.
12As expropriation is not very common in the real world, it is ruled out as a policy option,
even though all agents would prefer a command optimum in the model.
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problem is given by
ητ
η
= −rτ − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)E
τE
= −αE − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)βρ = τ − ατE
Implicitly differentiating yields dτ
dβ
> 0 and so dγ
dβ
= ∂γ
∂τ
dτ
dβ
< 0 when β > 0.
Hence, shifting social weight to labour reduces the after-tax return on capital
and so growth in the model. For simplicity I will concentrate on the polar cases
of left- and right-wing policies in what follows.
The optimal left-wing (β = 1) policy is then given by
τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] = ρ(1− α). (11)
The tax rate solving this equation is denoted by τˇ .
The right-wing government is only concerned about capital income in the
model. Maximizing (9) it chooses the growth maximizing tax rate τˆ and does
not redistribute. Under the left-wing policy τˇ > τˆ so that that policy does not
maximize growth. Thus, governments trade off growth against redistribution
when τˇ > τˆ .
Furthermore, notice dτˇ
dA
= α(1 − α)τˇ (τˇα − α(1− α)2A)−1 > 0 and dτˆ
dA
=
τˆ (αA)−1 > 0. For a change in A in a closed economy one gets dλ
dA
=
dτˇ
dA
τˆ
− dτˆdA τˇ
τˆ2
.
Now dλ
dA
< 0 if dτˇ
dA
τˆ < dτˆ
dA
τˇ ⇔ τˆ < τˇ which is true. Hence, the optima imply
that an increase in efficiency leads to less redistribution in the model. Although
higher A implies higher τˆ and τˇ , the increase in τˆ is relatively bigger than that
of τˇ . This means for a closed economy that relatively and for an increase in
efficiency it is better to have higher tax rates and channel more public resources
into production under the right-wing than under the redistributing policy.
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3 Tax Competition
It is clear that the optimal, closed economy policies will be affected if govern-
ments have to decide in a world with capital mobility and they cannot coordinate
their policies. If full tax harmonization is not feasible, governments may engage
in tax competition as has, for instance, been argued by Sinn (1990) or Boven-
berg (1994). Tax competition is modelled here as a two-stage game where the
governments move simultaneously, but before the private sector. The strategies
of the governments are the choices of taxes. The governments and the private
sector agents move simultaneously. Furthermore, both economies have the same
initial capital stock k0 = k
∗
0, and are equally efficient, A = A
∗, unless stated oth-
erwise. Solving backwards requires a government to maximize welfare taking its
opponent’s choice of τ ∗ as given. Thus, each government’s problem is to choose
taxes so that τ = argmax {V j; given τ ∗}, where j = l, r. That is now analyzed
for economies which are technologically similar or significantly different.
Technologically Similar Economies Consider a domestic, non-redistributing
government. As V r is increasing in γ and only the growth rate depends on taxes,
the right-wing governments’ problem reduces to finding
τ = argmax {M ; given τ ∗} .
Thus, it wants to maximize M , given τ ∗ and given the optimal, private sector
reaction functions ω and ω∗. Recall a(τ) ≡ r − τ and b(τ ∗) ≡ r∗ − τ ∗, where b is
independent of τ . Then M = max(a, b) and a is a continuous function of τ . But
for given τ ∗ the function b is as well, because a constant is a continuous function
of a variable x. Then M(τ) = max (a(τ), b(τ ∗)) = a(τ)+b(τ
∗)
2
+
∣∣∣a(τ)−b(τ∗)2 ∣∣∣ , which
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may be differentiable under certain conditions.13
Figure 1: M(τ, τ ∗) for the domestic government and given τ ∗
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Clearly, for similar economies τˆ = τˆ ∗. Suppose the foreign government sets
τ ∗ ≷ τˆ ∗, then b < bˆ where bˆ = rˆ∗− τˆ ∗. As a consequence there is some τ ∈ [τ ∗l , τ ∗u ]
where a ≥ b, because at τ ∗l , τ ∗u the functions a and b intersect. From Figure
1, the domestic right-wing government will choose τ ∈ (τ ∗l , τ ∗u). But then M is
differentiable and dM
dτ
= rτ − 1 = 0 and so τ = τˆ is an optimizing response of the
domestic right-wing government.
Suppose the foreign government sets τ ∗ = τˆ . In that case the b(τ ∗)-line would
be tangential to the point aˆ and M would not be differentiable anymore. Thus,
if τ ∗ = τˆ the optimal response is indeterminate.
Lemma 1 In similar economies the best response of a domestic right-wing gov-
ernment against any foreign opponent is to choose
(1) τ = τˆ if τ ∗ < τˆ
(2) τ ∈ [0, 1] if τ ∗ = τˆ .
13Use the following property of the max(·) function. Let f(x) and g(x) be two differentiable
functions in x, then max (f(x), g(x)) = f(x)+g(x)2 +
∣∣∣ f(x)−g(x)2 ∣∣∣.
15
The indeterminacy when the opponent sets τˆ reflects that the right-wing gov-
ernment does not care about the aggregate capital stock and ω, ω∗ per se. It
just wants to guarantee the highest worldwide income derived from domesti-
cally owned capital. So when the opponent chooses τˆ ∗ in technologically similar
economies, the domestic right-wing government’s problem has already been solved
by its foreign opponent.
A domestic left-wing government’s problem is to find
τ = argmax
{
V l; given τ ∗
}
.
Suppose τ ∗ > τˆ . From Figure 1 it is not difficult to see that if τ ∗ > τˇ the domestic
left-wing government sets τ = τˇ . If τˆ < τ ∗ ≤ τˇ , it is optimal to set τ = τ ∗ − ,
where  is small. As τ ∗ → τˆ the domestic left-wing government will definitely set
τ = τˆ . Thus,
Lemma 2 In similar economies the best response of a domestic left-wing gov-
ernment against any foreign opponent is to choose
(1) τ = τˇ if τ ∗ > τˇ
(2) τ = τ ∗ − , if τˆ < τ ∗ ≤ τˇ
(3) τ = τˆ , if τ ∗ → τˆ .
Given the best response functions the outcome of tax competition in similar
economies is as follows: For two right-wing governments and by symmetry Lemma
1 implies that there is an infinite number of Nash equilibria. That is due to the
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fact that if one player chooses τˆ the other player is indifferent what to choose.
Then the investors would never pay more or less than τˆ . In the Nash equilibrium
the after-tax returns are equal so that capital flight may take place.
Proposition 1 If two right-wing governments engage in tax competition in sim-
ilar economies, there is an infinite number of Nash equilibria. The capitalists
never pay more or less than τˆ in either country. Capital flight is possible and
there will be maximum GDP growth in at least one economy.
The infinite number of equilibria has an important economic meaning in the
model.14 A right-wing government is not concerned about the aggregate cap-
ital stock. It just maximizes the capitalists’ worldwide income. If the foreign
opponent actually chooses τˆ ∗ in equilibrium, then the domestic right-wing gov-
ernment’s problem is solved and it may optimally choose any tax rate. That has
significant consequences for the workers in either country. Among all equilibria
the one with τ = τ ∗ = τˆ is of measure zero and so quite improbable (although
perhaps the most plausible.) Consider the class of equilibria where τ ∗ = τˆ and
τ ∈ [0, 1] and τ 6= τˆ . Then in equilibrium one definitely observes capital flight in
the domestic economy so that Γ = 0 and the domestic workers would ’starve’. In
contrast, the foreign workers would be quite well off, since all the capital would
locate in their country. Hence, under right-right competition, capital flight is
14If one allows for equilibrium refinements a`-la Selten (1975), the introduction of small proba-
bilities that the opponent plays irrationally leads to a unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium
in which both right-wing governments set τˆ . As concerns strategic behaviour trembling hand
perfection seems a superior concept to require. On the other hand, the model’s extremely
large number of equilibria captures qualitatively interesting economic phenomena. For that
reason Nash equilibrium refinements are not considered any further. Furthermore, it may be
argued that the indeterminacy would also vanish when ’right-wing’ governments attached some
(possibly very small) weight on the workers’ welfare. It is not difficult to verify that then the
’right-wing’ government would optimally mimic a ’left-wing’ strategy, driven by the fear to lose
capital. But the latter is of no concern whatsoever for the capital owners. For that reason the
paper concentrates on strictly pro-capital (’right-wing’) objectives and policies.
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quite likely, the workers of one country may be really badly off and the capital
owners are equally well off in either economy.
If a left-wing and a right-wing government compete in taxes, the Nash equilib-
rium is unique. In a closed economy the domestic left-wing government chooses
τ > τˆ . Lemma 1 implies that for all τ 6= τˆ the foreign right-wing government
chooses τ ∗ = τˆ . By Lemma 2 the domestic left-wing government always tries
to undercut its opponent’s choice for fear of capital flight. But then the foreign
right-wing government makes sure that the capitalists income is maximized by
setting τ ∗ = τˆ whereupon the left-wing government will choose τ = τˆ . As a
consequence it cannot be that λ > 1.
Proposition 2 There is a unique Nash equilibrium in the right-left tax competi-
tion game with similar economies. The governments set τ = τˆ = τ ∗. There is no
redistribution, λ = 1, in the domestic left-wing government’s economy. Capital
flight is almost impossible and there is maximum GDP growth in both economies.
The objective of ’grabbing’ capital prevents redistribution in equilibrium and
is due to the left-wing government’s fear of capital flight. Capital ’grabbing’ and
the right-wing objective of capital income maximization reduce the number of
Nash equilibria to one. Thus, policy heterogeneity removes a source of indetermi-
nacy, makes capital flight quite unlikely and leads to equal GNP and GDP growth
for both economies. That is so, because in equilibrium with τ = τ ∗ = τˆ , the after-
tax returns will be equal and any ω, ω∗ combination is possible. Thus, in contrast
to the closed economy, a non-cooperative environment causes the left-wing gov-
ernment to mimic a growth maximizing policy. Importantly, the possibility of
capital flight for the domestic economy is of measure zero. Hence, the workers
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are ex ante better off under left-right than under right-right tax competition.
Proposition 1 implies that under right-right competition capital flight happens
in one economy so that the workers in that country will ’starve’. As the capital
allocation is indeterminate in an equilibrium with τ = τ ∗ = τˆ (Proposition 2), the
workers may be better off under either a right or a left-wing government. If the
capitalists happen to shift more capital into the foreign right-wing government’s
economy, its workers will be better off than their domestic counterparts. That
has the rather surprising implication that the workers may be better off under a
right-wing government.
Corollary 1 Under left-right tax competition in technologically similar economies
(A = A∗), the workers may be better off under a right or a left-wing government.
Economically, the results suggest that in highly integrated, technologically similar
economies political preferences per se are not very important in determining
growth or the well-being of a government’s clientele.
By Lemma 2 two left-wing governments try to undercut each other. But the
process of undercutting leads to τ = τˆ = τ ∗ and no redistribution.
Proposition 3 There is a unique Nash equilibrium in the left-left tax competition
game in similar economies. Both governments set τ = τˆ = τ ∗. There is no
redistribution, λ = 1 = λ∗ in either country. Capital flight is almost impossible
and there is maximum GDP growth in both economies.
With perfect capital mobility redistribution is not optimal in a non-cooperative
environment, even though the opponent may have the same distributive prefer-
ences. Thus, the effects of the concern for redistribution are competed away
for fear of capital flight. Interestingly, that makes two left-wing governments
19
mimic growth maximizing policies in the model. The workers are compensated
for non-redistribution by high growth of their wage income.
Technologically Different Economies If a domestic right-wing government
with a more efficient economy chooses its nationally optimal tax policy, no oppo-
nent can do better, because aˆ > bˆ at C’ in Figure 2. Thus, the foreign opponent
may choose anything and experiences capital flight. The efficient economy’s right-
wing government has higher GDP growth than any of its opponents.
Figure 2: Tax Competition Among Different Economies
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If a redistributing government’s closed economy becomes more efficient the
government may choose D’ or D”. In either case redistribution (λ) will decrease
as has been shown above. However, in the open economy D” cannot be optimal.
A domestic left-wing government with a more efficient economy will undercut
its opponent to prevent capital flight. It chooses τ such that a > bˆ at a point
such as D’, which may be very close to but is definitely to the left of point E,
because a foreign right-wing government would choose τˆ ∗ at C, if it could, and a
foreign left-wing government might choose that in the limit. Thus, redistribution
(λ > 1) and relatively high GDP growth are possible when a government with a
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more efficient economy chooses aˆ > a > bˆ.
Proposition 4 A domestic left-wing government with a more efficient economy
sets taxes so that it gets all the capital, has higher GDP growth than its opponent
and redistributes. The capital income component of GNP grows at equal rates
across countries.
Efficiency differences induce capital flight for an inefficient economy. Theo-
retically, an efficient economy’s right-wing policy leads to higher GDP growth
than a left-wing policy, when competing with inefficient economies’ governments.
The efficient economy’s left-wing government tries to get all the capital, but
does not necessarily choose the growth maximizing tax rate. Thus, a hypothet-
ical comparison of regimes when A > A∗ reveals that tax policies favouring the
non-accumulated factor of production might be bad for growth.
However, by Proposition 4 one may observe higher taxes favouring the non-
accumulated factor of production and higher GDP growth than in another, less
efficient economy with a non-redistributing government. Thus, in integrated
economies it is well possible that an efficient economy’s government distributes
towards labour and grows more than a less efficient economy under a non-
redistributing policy. Notice that the efficient economy’s government attracts
more resources for redistribution than in the closed economy and does this at
the expense of the inefficient economy’s workers. In that sense the workers of an
inefficient economy have to be afraid of a ’nationalistic’, left-wing policy abroad.
But then a government that wishes to redistribute should be relatively more
interested in having a superior technology brought about by innovations and tech-
nical progress. Indeed, this is implied by the model by the following arguments:
Under the optimal policies in the closed economy the welfare of the agents in
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(9) and (10) is given by V i(A, τ(A)) where n = l, r. An increase in A changes
welfare by dV i = ∂V
i
∂A
dA + ∂V
i
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
dA. By the envelope theorem ∂V
r
∂τ
= 0 under
the optimal right-wing policy and ∂V
l
∂τ
= 0 under the optimal left-wing policy.
Thus,
dV r
dA |τˆ
=
∂γˆ
∂A |τˆ
(
1
ρ2
)
and
dV l
dA |τˇ
=
∂η
∂A |τˇ
(
1
ηρ
)
+
∂γˇ
∂A |τˇ
(
1
ρ2
)
.
Evaluating the derivatives yields
∂γˆ
∂A |τˆ
=
∂rˆ
∂A |τˆ
= ατˆ 1−α <
∂γˇ
∂A |τˇ
=
∂rˇ
∂A |τˇ
= ατˇ 1−α
because τˇ > τˆ . Hence, 0 < dV
r
dA |τˆ <
dV l
dA |τˇ .
Thus, the model implies for a closed economy that an advance in technology
would benefit a pro-labour government relatively more in the long run than a pro-
capital government.15 The reason is that, once policy is controlled for, higher A
has a stronger effect on the pre-tax return on capital under the left-wing policy.
This is because the left-wing policy channels more public inputs into production.
A better technology allows these public inputs to be used more efficiently and
that raises the pre-tax return. This effect is larger under the left-wing policy.
Given the optimal policy a higher pre-tax return is good for growth and that
affects the welfare of the workers more than that of the capital owners.
The result relates to growth models based on the patent race literature. See,
for example, Reinganum (1989), Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), chpt. 7 or
Aghion and Howitt (1998). These models tell us that incumbents of the lead-
15In this context Rehme (2000) also shows for the closed economy that this holds as well for
the individual worker and capital owner. Of course, the result need not apply in the short run
when workers might have to learn new technologies or there is resistance to reform. For models
studying these issues see e.g. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Helpman and Rangel (1999) or
Canton, de Groot and Nahuis (1999).
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ing edge technology have a strong incentive to undertake research to keep their
leading edge position with high growth. Thus, (redistributing) countries that are
technological leaders may have a strong incentive to expend large amounts of
resources on R&D to keep their leading position vis-a-vis technological followers
and in order to protect their redistributive freedom. This latter element means
that redistributing countries may have a relatively greater incentive to keep or
get into a technological leadership position.
For integrated economies a similar conclusion may be rationalized as follows:
Take the foreign inefficient economy. A right-wing government in that economy
would choose τˆ ∗ at point C in Figure 2 in a closed economy. If the opponent
in the efficient economy chooses C’ or anything to the left of point E, the right-
wing government’s clientele, that is, the capital owners in the inefficient economy
would not suffer. In contrast, even when a government that wishes to redistribute
is forced to choose a point such as C with no redistribution, its clientele, that is,
the workers would suffer infinite disutility in the inefficient economy.
Proposition 5 Governments that represent the non-accumulated factor of pro-
duction only and that wish to redistribute resources from the accumulated to the
non-accumulated factor of production may have a relatively greater incentive in
the long run to have an economy with a superior technology than governments
representing the accumulated factor of production only.
The paper hypothesizes that governments in an integrated world would only
distribute resources towards the non-accumulated factor of production, if they
have an efficiency advantage vis-a`-vis another government’s economy. Is that not
the case, it is argued that a government would optimally not redistribute. But
then one would observe a positive and spurious association between redistribution
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and growth when across countries redistributing governments act as in this paper.
Hence, the effect of redistributive taxation on growth in an integrated world may
be less an issue of political preferences, but more one of efficiency differences.
To generalize these results suppose capital mobility was not perfect. Then in a
market equilibrium the returns to capital would in general not be the same across
countries for given policy. For similar countries the tax competition equilibria
would all be unique because of the costs to capital relocations or due to a SQ
policy, which strictly attempts to prevent capital outflows. Furthermore, in a
technologically superior economy the policies would be qualitatively the same if
the government pursued SM and perfect capital mobility prevailed or pursued
SQ and capital mobility was imperfect. Thus, all the essential qualitative results
would hold if, complementing Rehme (1997), there was imperfect capital mobility
and the government pursued a SQ policy.
4 Conclusion
In contrast to theoretical predictions, redistribution is often found to correlate
positively with long-run growth across countries in empirical studies. This dis-
crepancy in results is analyzed by placing growth-redistribution problems in a
two-country world with capital mobility and tax competition among governments.
It is shown that the possibility of capital outflows features saliently in the
optimal decisions of redistributing governments. In the paper a left-wing gov-
ernment wants to attract as much capital as possible for securing high wages
and for redistribution. It is concerned about the level and growth of domestic
GDP. In contrast, a right-wing government only wants to maximize the national
capitalists’ worldwide return on capital.
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For tax competition among similar economies and no matter what distribu-
tional preferences a government has, the fear of capital flight leads to maximum
growth of the capital income component of GNP in equilibrium and no redistri-
bution takes place. That holds even though all governments might care about
redistribution. The reason is that capital is good for redistributing governments.
Capital flight reduces wages and the welfare loss incurred by a drop in wages
outweighs the welfare gain derived from redistribution. However, political prefer-
ences do matter as regards GDP. Under right-right tax competition one economy
will surely experience capital flight and its GDP will not grow. That constellation
is bad for the workers. If a left-wing government competes against any opponent,
no capital flight will take place. In that sense, (re-)distributive preferences are
important for a country’s non-accumulated factor of production.
If the countries are technologically different, more capital will locate in the
efficient economy and it will have higher growth. If the efficient country’s gov-
ernment wishes to redistribute, it may do so without losing any capital. In fact,
it may have more resources for redistribution than in a closed economy and may,
thus, be interested in high economic integration. The amount of redistribution
depends on who the opponent is and on the efficiency gap that distinguishes it
from its opponents. From these arguments it follows that one might well observe
a positive association between growth and redistribution.
Furthermore, the paper argues that policies that make a domestic economy
more efficient are in the interest of both domestic workers and foreign as well
as domestic capital owners. However, the pressure to do so would be relatively
larger for the workers as they may suffer more from possible capital outflows than
the capital owners.
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